my derivation of the Born rule


I just read (parts of) Sean Carroll's derivation of the Born rule, but I do not find it very convincing, because there is a much simpler, straightforward derivation available to resolve this problem of "self-locating uncertainty".

1) We shall use a "hardcore" many worlds interpretation, assuming that the world splits into a quasi-infinite number of branches at any time, which realizes all possible outcomes of quantum theory. We assume that those branches are all equally real and a simple counting argument shows that the Born rule does not hold for almost all of those branches. It follows that we do not live in one of those generic branches, which solves the first part of our self-location problem.

2) It is reasonable to assume that some of those infinitely many branches contain at least one quantum computer capable of simulating human life. Those computers will have to simulate quantum theory, but we can further assume that they will only keep one branch at a time in order to save resources. It is straightforward to assume that they are programmed to use the Born rule to select this branch randomly.

3) We observe the Born rule to great precision and it follows that we are the human beings simulated in one of those quantum computers. This finally resolves the self-location problem.

I would add that (some of) the simulated human beings will use the Copenhagen interpretation to explain what they experience; i.e. an interpretation which emphasizes the importance of the observer and her 'conscious experience'. Obviously, the simulated human beings are unaware that their 'conscious experience' is indeed a side effect of the procedure which selects the simulated branch randomly.

1 comment:

wolfgang said...

I just noticed that Adrian Kent wrote about "some problems which seem likely sufficient to
doom Sebens and Carroll‘s general approach".